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Abstract
To what extent does education alleviate income inequality induced by globaliza-
tion? What are the corresponding intergenerational welfare implications? I incorporate
human capital and capital accumulation into a dynamic, multi-country general equi-
librium model, and study the exact transitional path. Interactions between compara-
tive advantage, capital accumulation, and endogenous education are the main driving
forces of the inequality dynamics. These channels reflect ability to adjust factor supply
at different stages of the transition. I parameterize themodel for 40 countries, six sectors
using the World Input-Output Database. Trade liberalization raise the skill premium,
the skill share and the real wage for both skilled and unskilled workers in all countries
in my model. Through decomposition, I find that education eliminates trade-induced
inequality by 65% on average. My model also suggests that globalization can cause
more intergenerational inequality. Because older and more educated people generally
benefit relatively more from globalization.
∗I am grateful to Jonathan Eaton, Jingting Fan, Michael Gechter, Kim Ruhl and Stephen Yeaple
for useful comments and suggestions.
†Institute of Economics, Academic Sinica, email: hanyang@econ.sinica.edu.tw
1 Introduction
To what extent does education alleviate income inequality between skilled and un-
skilled workers induced by globalization? How does educational attainment re-
spond to trade shocks? How are gains from trade distributed across generations
and education attainment in the short run and long run? The main objective of
this paper is to address these important questions. Existing work mainly focuses
on two-country or small open economy examples. This paper aims to provide the
transitional paths of educational outcome, inequality, and other economic variables
in a multi-country global equilibrium setting. I present a dynamic general equilib-
rium model of trade with endogenous educational choice to quantify the interac-
tions among comparative advantage, skill-biased technical change, and education.
Recent empirical studies offer compelling evidence that an individual’s educa-
tional decision is influenced by comparative advantage in international trade. Hick-
man and Olney (2011) study the U.S. economy, finding that globalization increases
the educational attainment of workers in the United States. Atkin (2016) studies
Mexico in the period between 1986 and 2000, finding that export expansion in the
manufacturing sector is associatedwith an increased high school dropout rate. Blan-
chard and Olney (2017) use a panel of 102 countries over 45 years to investigate the
relationship between export composition and educational attainment. By imple-
menting a gravity regression to eliminate endogeneity, Blanchard and Blanchard
and Olney (2017) find that increases in the export of high-skill intensive goods are
associated with higher educational attainment, while increases in the export of low-
skill intensive goods are associated with lower educational attainment.
Although conventional trade models suggest that globalization can reduce the
skill premium in developing countries and raise the skill premium in developed
countries through the reallocation of labor across sectors (i.e., the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem), empirical evidence shows that globalization can increase the skill pre-
mium for both developing and developed countries (see Goldberg and Pavcnik
2007). Rising income inequality in many countries over the last two decades has
become a growing concern for policy makers around the world OECD. (2008) and
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)). Education is often regarded as an instrument to com-
bat inequality (see Corak 2013 and Gregorio and Lee 2002). Therefore, quantifying
the effectiveness of education in reducing trade-induced inequality is an important
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objective of this paper and has substantial policy relevance.
Empirical studies offer evidence that educational attainment and the skill pre-
mium are influenced by globalization, but are not capable of evaluating the quan-
titative effects of trade shocks and relevant policies on educational outcomes. This
paper aims to provide a framework for analysis by constructing and calibrating a
quantitative model built upon the following insights offered by Atkin (2016): (1) the
opportunity cost of education is the time an individual could have spent working as
an unskilled worker, and (2) globalization may create jobs of different skill intensi-
ties. My model provides a tractable framework to quantify the dynamic impacts of
trade shocks on educational attainment, the skill premium, intergenerational wel-
fare, and other important economic variables in a globalized economy.
The main driving forces of this model are cross-industry differences in skill in-
tensity, and cross-country differences in productivity and educational institutions,
capital-skill complementarity, and educational choice. Following Eaton and Kor-
tum (2002) (henceforth EK), there are continuums of heterogeneous sector-specific
intermediate goods in which each uses capital and skilled and unskilled workers
as inputs, combined according to a constant returns to scale production function.
Moreover, sectoral good producers pool intermediates from all over the world for
production, while final good producers purchase sectoral goods from the domestic
market and combine them to produce the composite final good.
Without loss of generality, I assume the representative household in each coun-
try dictates capital investment and total consumption. The representative house-
hold has perfect foresight and maximizes its welfare as a function of a stream of
discounted instantaneous utility from total real consumption.
The economy is populated by infinitely-lived individuals who face a constant
probability of death in each period (as in Blanchard (1985)). I assume there is no
population growth, so the perished population is replenished by newly born in-
dividuals each period. Forward-looking individuals face a one-time idiosyncratic
innate ability shock. Heterogeneous innate ability is directly linked to the time cost
of education. Education is a binary decision. An individual chooses whether to
pursue education in his first period of life. If he chooses to pursue higher educa-
tion, he must spend some proportion of his time each period to maintain his status
as a skilled worker, using his remaining time to earn wages through skilled labor.
The higher the innate ability of an individual and quality of country-specific edu-
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cational institutions, the lower the time cost associated with education. If an indi-
vidual chooses not to pursue higher education, he spends his time earning wages as
an unskilled worker. Forward-looking individuals make decisions regarding edu-
cation based on future states of the economy, which in turn determine the dynamic
of aggregate skill supply in each country.
My multi-country model captures short-, medium- and long-run effects on the
economy due to trade shocks or structural change. In the short run, since all fac-
tors for production are unable to adjust supply promptly, comparative advantage
represents the sole driver of prices and trade. The skill premium rises in countries
with a comparative advantage in skill-intensive sectors, and falls in countries with
a comparative advantage in skill-unintensive sectors. In the medium run, physical
capital adjusts faster than human capital, meaning that the skill premium is mainly
driven by capital accumulation. Supposing capital becomes cheaper, a country in-
vests more in capital formation. Since my model features complementarity between
capital and skilled labor, the relative productivity of skilled workers rises. As a
result, the skill premium rises. In the long run, the skill supply adjusts freely in
response to changes in the skill premium. The adjustment in skill supply neutral-
izes the short- and medium-run effects from comparative advantage and physical
capital investment, shaping the long-run outcome.
I apply a parameterized model to investigate the effect of trade liberalization (a
25% bilateral trade cost reduction) on labor markets in 40 countries in my sample.
The principal interest considers the skill premium and the relative skill supply. Fol-
lowing the definition in my data, a skilled worker is a worker who has at least a
college degree. Designed to capture between-educational-category inequality, the
skill premium is defined as the ratio of wages of skilled to unskilled workers. Rela-
tive skill supply is defined as the ratio of the supply of skilled to unskilled workers.
The counterfactual shows that a decline in bilateral trade costs raises the long-run
skill premium for all countries in my sample. This result indicates that capital-skill
complementarity is the dominant force shaping income distribution. The transi-
tional path also shows that inequality is more severe in the short run than in the
long run. In addition, educational attainment increases for all countries. By com-
paring the transitional paths both allowing and forbidding workers to pursue an
education, my model suggests that education can eliminate nearly 65% of between-
educational-category inequality induced by globalization.
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Furthermore, I study the distribution of gains from trade across generations
and education categories. By comparing the percentage gain in discounted lifetime
wealth for each group, I find that the older and educated group gains the most from
globalization, while the oldest and uneducated group gains the least. This finding
shows that globalization can be a source of increasing intergenerational inequality,
leading to an expanding understanding of the recent heated discussion about inter-
generational inequality1.
The existing literature examines the interaction between skill premium and inter-
national trade from a wide range of perspectives, which include skill-biased tech-
nology (Burstein and Vogel 2016, Parro 2013 and Yeaple 2005), structural change
(Cravino and Sotelo 2016 and Xu 2016), and global value chain (Costinot et al. 2012).
One common assumption throughout this research is that the supply of skilled
workers is exogenously determined. However, such an assumption excludes the
potential impact of endogenous skill supply on the skill premium. As a result, trade
patterns are mainly determined by cross-country differences in the abundance of
skill and productivity, and cross-sector differences in skill intensities. Because ex-
ogenous shocks in these models only affect relative skill demand, the quantitative
results depict movement along a vertical skill supply curve. Thus, the ensuing anal-
ysis can potentially exaggerate changes in skill premium. My model suggests that
this research only captures short- and medium-run outcomes.
This paper is not the first to study the interaction between international trade
and educational choice. Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) build a two-country, two-
sector Heckscher-Ohlin model with endogenous educational choice. In their model,
the Stolper-Samuelson effect drives the relative return between skilled and unskilled
labor. When a country with a comparative advantage in skill-intensive sector is
more opens to trade, the relative reward to skill rises and the country becomes more
skill abundant. Danziger (2017) studies a dynamic model of educational choice and
trade that is restricted to small open economies. In contrast, my model considers a
multi-country setting in which the skill premium and educational choice are driven
by both comparative advantage and the quality of educational institutions, and ad-
dresses effects for developed and developing countries simultaneously under a sin-
gle framework..2 Blanchard andWillmann (2016) utilize a two-country general equi-
1See Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2002)
2Furthermore, my framework studies how small changes of economic fundamentals can have
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librium model to show that the curvature of the education cost function can deter-
mine trade patterns, demonstrating how globalization induces the polarization of
skills and wages.
My model offers quantitative and theoretical foundations of educational choice
and international trade studied by Atkin (2016),Blanchard and Olney (2017), as well
asHickman and Olney (2011). By adapting the procedure of Alvarez and Lucas
(2007)to a dynamic framework, this paper also aligns with recent growing literature
on dynamic trade.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the dy-
namic model of international trade and educational choice. In Section 3, I demon-
strate the intuition and mechanisms of the model by using a simplified two-country
two-sector economy. In Section 4, I explain how the model is parameterized and
calibrated. In Section 5, I present counterfactual results about the effect of trade lib-
eralization on dynamic educational outcomes and on the distribution of gains from
trade across generations and educational categories. Lastly, Section 6 concludes this
paper.
2 Model
I consider an economy of N countries and J sectors, where countries are indexed
by i and n, and sectors are indexed by j. Within each sector j, there is a continuum
of intermediates ω ∈ [0, 1]. The international trade setting for each industry follows
Eaton and Kortum (2002). A final goods producer in each country buys sector-j
goods domestically, and combines them to produce a final good. All markets are
competitive, including factor markets and goods markets.
2.1 Workers
The economy is populated by infinitely-lived individuals who face constant prob-
ability of death ζ in each period (as in Blanchard 1985). At each time t, there is a
aggregate impacts for different countries and labor markets. The framework of Danziger (2017) only
offers an analysis of aggregate impacts on a single country.
3Artuc¸ et al. (2010), Dix-Carneiro (2014) and Caliendo et al. (2015) study trade shocks on the
reallocation of workers. Alvarez (2017), Caliendo et al. (2015), Eaton et al. (2016), and Ravikumar
et al. (2017) study dynamic multi-country trade model.
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population of mass Li born in country i. I assume there is no population growth;
hence, newly born individuals exactly replenish the perished population in each
period.
Upon birth, each worker draws idiosyncratic innate ability a from a Pareto dis-
tribution G(x) = 1 − x−1, x ∈ [1,∞). The realization of innate ability is directly
linked to the cost of education. Each worker decides about obtaining an education
in his first period; if he chooses to become educated, he will stay educated for the
rest of his lifetime. Similarly, if he chooses not to pursue an education, he would not
be able to do so in the future. Each worker is endowed with one unit of time in each
period. If an individual chooses to pursue an education, he must spend a−γi of his
time in each period to maintain his education status, spending his remaining time
to earn wages as a skilled worker. If an individual chooses not to pursue education,
he uses the entirety of his time to earn wages as an unskilled worker.
The time cost of education is determined by the innate ability of each individual
and a country-specific parameter γi. The cost is inversely related to innate ability
a (i.e., the smarter an individual is, the lower the time cost to maintain his status
as a skilled worker). Parameter γi captures the quality of educational institutions
in country i. Given the same level of innate ability, the larger γi is, the less time
required in each period to maintain educational status. Countries with larger γi
provide better environments for workers to pursue an education.
At time t + s, a skilled worker in country i receives a wage of wHi,t+s, while an
unskilled worker receives wLi,t+s. Workers’ instantaneous utility function is logarith-
mic, with future consumption discounted at a rate of β ∈ [0, 1]. Since individuals
face a constant chance of death ζ , the effective discount factor is ν = (1− ζ)β. Each
worker has perfect foresight about the aggregate economy and evaluates the bene-
fits of being a skilled versus an unskilled worker in deciding whether to pursue an
education. Assume individuals cannot save their income, the optimization problem
for a worker with innate ability a born in country i at time t is given by:
max
{
∞∑
s=0
νs log
[
(1−
1
aγi
)
wHi,t+s
Pi,t+s
]
,
∞∑
s=0
νs log
[wLi,t+s
Pi,t+s
]}
. (1)
By equating the benefit of being a skilled worker versus an unskilled worker, we
derive the threshold innate ability a¯i,t. A worker with innate abilitya¯i,t in country
i born at time t is indifferent between being a skilled or an unskilled worker. This
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threshold ability is denoted by:
a¯i,t =
[
1−
( ∞∏
s=0
(wLi,t+s
wHi,t+s
)νs) 1∑∞s=0 νs ]− 1γi (2)
For a worker born at time t in country i, if his innate ability is larger than a¯i,t,
the benefit of being a skilled worker outweighs that of being an unskilled worker;
hence, he pursues an education. In all other instances, he does not pursue education
otherwise. Equation (2) denotes a key equilibrium condition which implies that a
more efficient educational institution and higher skill premium in the subsequent
periods are associated with higher educational attainment.
2.2 Labor Supply Dynamic
Computing skilled and unskilled labor supply of country i at time t requires infor-
mation about the skill supply from the last period as well as the ability threshold
of the current generation. Givena¯i,t, the average skilled labor hour of country i and
generation t is given by:
∫ ∞
a¯i,t
(1−
1
xγi
)dG(x) = a¯−1i,t −
1
(1 + γi)
a¯
−(γi+1)
i,t = µi,t. (3)
Similarly, given a¯i,t, the average unskilled labor supply of country i and generation
t is given by:
∫ a¯i,t
1
dG(x) = G(a¯i,t). (4)
Letting LHi,t and L
L
i,t be the total skilled and unskilled labor supply of country i at
time t, the transitions of skilled and unskilled labor supply can be characterized by:
LHi,t = (1− ζ)L
H
i,t−1 + µi,tLi (5)
LLi,t = (1− ζ)L
L
i,t−1 +G(a¯i,t)Li. (6)
The first term on the right-hand side of equations (5) and (6) capture the remaining
population from the existing labor force pool. Adding the supply of skilled and un-
skilled labor from newly born individuals, we arrive at the total labor supply at time
7
t. The evolution of the skilled and unskilled labor supply can be fully characterized
by their corresponding initial values and path of ability thresholds.
2.3 Production
I introduce capital-skill complementarity in the production function of sector-j in-
termediate ω. Capital, skilled workers, and unskilled workers are used to produce
intermediates. Production of sector-j intermediate ω follows a technology:
M ji,t(ω) =
(
[δji ]
1/ρ[LH,ji,t (ω)]
ρ−1
ρ + [1− δji ]
1/ρ[Kji,t(ω)]
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(7)
yji,t(ω) = A
j
i,t(ω)B
j
i [L
L
i,t(ω)]
αji [M ji,t(ω)]
1−αji (8)
where Kji,t(ω), L
H
i,t(ω) and L
H
i,t(ω) are the amounts of capital, skilled, and unskilled
workers respectively used by producer of intermediate ω. Specifically, capital and
skilled workers are combined in a CES function with an elasticity of substitution ρ
to produce M ji,t(ω). The intermediate production follows a Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy combining unskilled labor and M ji,t(ω). The input share of unskilled labor is
represented by αji , with lower values of α
j
i resulting in a more skill-intensive sector
j. Skill intensities are heterogeneous across both sectors. Additionally, is the pro-
ductivity of intermediate ω of sector j in country i at time t, and is drawn from a
Fre´chet distribution F ji,t(z) = e
−T ji,tz
−θ
. Lastly, Bji = (α
j
i )
−αji (1 − αji )
−(1−αji ) is a nor-
malizing parameter. Letting ri,t, w
H
i,t and w
L
i,t be the capital rent and wages of skilled
and unskilled workers in countryi at time t, the unit cost to produce intermediate ω
of sector j in country i at time t is given by:
cji,t(ω) =
cji,t
Aji,t(ω)
(9)
with
cji,t = (w
L
i,t)
αji (PM,ji,t )
1−αji (10)
pM,ji,t =
[
δji (w
H
i,t)
1−ρ + (1− δji )(ri,t)
1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ (11)
Sector-j goods in country i are produced by using intermediates ω ∈ [0, 1] priced
at pji,t(ω). Intermediates ω are either from a domestic market or foreign countries.
Letting Y ji,t be the total quantity of sector-j goods in country i produced at time t,
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and qji,t(ω) be the total quantity of intermediate ω used by sector j in country i at
time t, the production of sector-j good follows a CES technology:
Y ji,t =
(∫ 1
0
[qji,t(ω)]
η−1
η dω
) η
η−1
, (12)
where η is the elasticity of substitution within a sector. Sector-j price index in coun-
try i at time t is given by:
P ji,t =
(∫ 1
0
[pji,t(ω)]
1−ηdω
) 1
1−η
(13)
The final goods producer in country i combines sectoral goods from the domestic
market priced at P ji,t. Letting Yi,t be the total output of final goods in country i at
time t, and qji,t be the amount of sectoral goods used by the final good production,
the production of final good follows a CES technology:
Yi,t =
(
J∑
j=1
[qji,t]
σ−1
σ
) σ
1−σ
, (14)
where ρ is the elasticity of substitution across sectors. The price index in country i
at time t is given by:
Pi,t =
[
J∑
j=1
(P ji,t)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
(15)
The total expenditure on sector-j good in the production of final good in country i
at time t is given by:
Eji,t =
(
P ji,t
Pi,t
) 1
1−σ
× Pi,tYi,t (16)
2.4 Capital Supply
For simplicity, assume representative household in each country dictates the deci-
sion of capital investment. Individuals do not make decision regarding investment.
Instead, the social planner in country i maximizes the following lifetime welfare
function:
Ui =
∞∑
t=0
νt log(Ci,t), (17)
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with resource constraints:
Wi,t = w
H
i,tL
H
i,t + w
L
i,tL
L
i,t + ri,tKi,t (18)
Wi,t
Pi,t
= Ci,t + Ii,t (19)
Ki,t+1 = (1− δ)Ki,t + Ii,t, (20)
where Ci,t, Ii,t is the real consumption and investment, respectively, of country i at
time t, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The representative household in each
country collects all nominal income from workers and capital, and then allocates
resources between real consumption Ci,t and capital investment Ii,t by solving the
optimization problem. Equation (20) captures capital stock dynamic in country i.
As stated previously, the representative household has perfect foresight. Solving
the maximization problem, the following Euler’s equations are given by:
λi,t =
1
Ci,t
(21)
− λi,t + νλi,t+1
[
ri,t+1
Pi,t+1
+ (1− δ)
]
= 0 (22)
Wi,t
Pi,t
= Ci,t +Ki,t+1 − (1− δ)Ki,t. (23)
The dynamics of capital are governed by the Euler’s equations. These conditions
pin down the transition of capital supply for each country. Combining this with the
transition of skill supply, we derive the factor supply for every country at each time
period.
2.5 International Trade
The iceberg trade cost of delivering one unit of a sector-j intermediate from country
i to n is denoted by dji,n ≥ 1. Hence, the unit cost of producing sector-j interme-
diate ω in country i after delivering to country n is given by cji,n,t(ω) = c
j
i,t(ω)d
j
i,n.
Since the market is competitive, the sector-j good producer in country n buys each
intermediate ω from the cheapest source, the price of intermediate ω is given by:
pji,n,t(ω) = min
i
{
cji,n,t(ω)
}
. (24)
Following (Eaton and Kortum, 2002), to solve trade share and sectoral price in-
dices, the probability of country n buying sector-j intermediates from country i at
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time t is
piji,n,t =
T ji,t[d
j
i,nc
j
i,t]
−θ∑N
i′=1 T
j
k,t[d
j
i′,nc
j
i′,tc
j
i′,t]
−θ
=
T ji,t[d
j
i,nc
j
i,t]
−θ
Φjn,t
. (25)
piji,n,t is also n’s expenditure share on i in sector j. Let E
j
i,n,t be the total sector-j
intermediate export from country i to country n at time t, and is given by
Eji,n,t = pi
j
i,n,tE
j
n,t =
T ji,t[d
j
i,nc
j
i,t]
−θ
Φjn,t
Ejn,t. (26)
Equation (26) is the gravity equation, where θ is the trade elasticity, i.e., the elastic-
ity of export with respect to trade cost. A smaller dispersion of productivity across
countries corresponds to higher trade elasticity, since trade flows are more respon-
sive to trade cost when countries are more similar in the distribution of productivity.
The price index for sector j in country n at time t is given by:
P jn,t =
[ ∫ 1
0
pjn,t(ω)
1−ηdω
] 1
1−η
=Γ(
θ − 1 + η
θ
)× [Φjn,t]
− 1
θ , (27)
where Γ(·) is a gamma function.
2.6 General Equilibrium
Assuming trade is balanced, the goodsmarkets and all factor markets clear for every
country and all time periods in the general equilibrium. The sectoral goods are
cleared if the following condition holds for each i, j, and t:
Eji,t = P
j
i,tY
j
i,t =
N∑
n=1
piji,n,tE
j
n,t (28)
Where Eji,t is the value of gross output of sector j in country i at time t. Equi-
librium also requires total spending equals total income for each country and each
time period,
Pi,tYi,t = w
H
i,tL
H
i,t + w
L
i,tL
L
i,t + ri,tKi,t (29)
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Since factors can freely move across sectors but are unable to move across coun-
tries, factor prices are equalized across sectors within each country. The market
clearing conditions for capital, skilled, and unskilled labor in country i at time t is
ri,tKi,t =
J∑
j=1

(1− αji )(1− δji )
(
ri,t
PM,ji,t
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
piji,n,tX
j
n,t

 (30)
wHi,tL
H
i,t =
J∑
j=1

(1− αji )δji
(
wHi,t
PM,ji,t
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
piji,n,tX
j
n,t

 (31)
wLi,tL
L
i,t =
J∑
j=1
[
αji
N∑
n=1
piji,n,tX
j
n,t
]
. (32)
The left-hand side of equations (30) to (32) is the total income of each factor in coun-
try i at time t, and the right-hand side is the total payment to each factor. In equilib-
rium, these market conditions hold across alli and all t.
Given all equilibrium conditions, including the solutions to maximization prob-
lems, trade share, and price indices, the equilibrium is defined in the followingman-
ner. Denoting economic fundamental at time t as Ψt, which include bilateral trade
cost dji,n,t, ∀i, n ∈ N, j ∈ J , and productivity T
j
i,t, ∀i,∈ N, j ∈ J , these variables can
potentially be time-varying but are deterministic and converge at some constants.
Denoting the initial condition asΘ0, it includes initial factor supplyKi,0, L
H
i,0 and L
L
i,0
∀i. Given Θ0 and {Ψt}
∞
t=0, an equilibrium is comprised of sequences of factor prices,
ability threshold, and factor supply {ri,t, w
H
i,t, w
L
i,t, a¯i,t, Ki,t, L
H
i,t, L
L
i,t}
∞
t=0, ∀i ∈ N such
that all equilibrium conditions and market clearing conditions are satisfied.
Steady state equilibrium can be defined similarly. Given steady-state fundamen-
tal Ψ∗, which includes trade cost dji,n, ∀i, n ∈ N, j ∈ J and T
j
i , ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ J , a
steady-state equilibrium is {ri, w
H
i , w
L
i , a¯i, Ki, L
H
i , L
L
i }, ∀i ∈ N such that all equilib-
rium conditions and market clearing conditions are satisfied.4
3 Special Cases
In this section, I explore a simplified version of mymodel to demonstrate the under-
lying mechanisms. These mechanisms consist of the comparative advantage chan-
4See the Appendix (D) for the equilibrium conditions of steady state and the algorithm to compute
both steady state and transitional path.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameters for the Simplified Cases
Parameters Value
Elasticity of substitution across sector: σ 2.2
Elasticity of substitution within sector: η 2.7
Elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital: ρ 1
Productivity dispersion: θ 4
Unskilled labor intensity in manufacturing: αM 0.7
Unskilled labor intensity in service: αS 0.3
Skill share relative to capita: δj 0.7
Population: Li 1
nel and the educational institution channel. The following questions are studied:
(1) How comparative advantage shapes the skill premium and skill supply? and (2)
What role does educational institutions play in determining the trade pattern and
educational outcomes? The model is simplified based on the following assump-
tions. There are two countries (North and South), two sectors (service and manu-
facturing), and the manufacturing sector is more unskilled labor intensive. I also
assume that there is no capital-skill complementarity (setting ρ = 1) to emphasize
other mechanisms.
In what follows, I study each of these mechanisms quantitatively. Values of the
baseline parameters used are listed in Table (1).
3.1 The Comparative Advantage Mechanism
In this subsection, I assume the following: (1) T ji = 1 for all i and j except for
T serviceNorth = 2; (2) educational efficiencies are all set to γi = 1 for all i; and (3) initial
bilateral trade cost is set to dji,n = 3. As a result, North has a comparative advantage
in the high-skill sector, while South has a comparative advantage in the low-skill
sector. The quantitative experiment is to gradually reduce the trade cost until all
trade barriers are removed, and record the changes in skill premium and skill supply
relative to the baseline equilibrium.
Figure (1) presents the changes in the skill premium and the relative skill sup-
ply for this quantitative experiment. As in the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, the reduction in trade costs causes the factors to be allocated toward the
13
Figure 1: An Illustration of Stolper-Samuelson Mechanism
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(a) Evolution of skill premium.
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(b) Evolution of relative skill supply.
sectors that have a comparative advantage in each country. Since North has a com-
parative advantage in the high-skill sector, the between-sector reallocation induced
by the trade cost reduction raises the skill premium in the North. In response to
the higher skill premium, workers in the North seek more education, meaning that
educational attainment also rises. These changes in educational outcome reflect the
outward shift of relative skill demand along a positively sloped skill supply. As a
result, the relative price rises and relative quantity falls. The opposite occurs in the
South since it has a comparative advantage in the low-skill sector.
The results of this quantitative experiment echo the theoretical prediction of
Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) that trade liberalization induces skill-upgrading or
skill-downgrading in accordance with a country’s comparative advantage. In addi-
tion, the results are consistent with the empirical findings of Blanchard and Olney
(2017).
3.2 The Educational Institution Mechanism
In this subsection, I study the educational institution mechanism, assuming produc-
tivity across countries and sectors are the same, T ji = 1 for all i, j, and zero trade
costs for any j, i, n. The goal of these assumptions is to isolate the effect that educa-
tional institutions have on the economy. The initial values for educational efficiency
γi are set to 1 for all countries in the baseline. The quantitative experiment entails
gradually increasing North’s educational efficiency until it reaches 1.5, while hold-
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Figure 2: An Illustration of Education Institution Mechanism
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(a) Changes (%) in the skill
premium.
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(b) Changes (%) in the skill
share.
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(c) Changes (%) in the export
share of high-skill sector.
ing everything else unchanged, and record the changes in the skill premium, the
relative skill supply, and the patterns of specialization.
Figure (2)presents the changes in the skill premium, the relative skill supply, and
the pattern of specialization for the economy. Panel (2a) and (2b) in Figure (2) show
that as North’s educational institutions become more robust, the skill premium falls
and educational attainment rises. An improvement in North’s educational insti-
tutions does not have a significant impact on South’s labor market, as it slightly
reduces the skill premium and relative skill supply of the latter.
Even though North’s institutional improvement has no meaningful impact on
South’s labor market, it has a significant impact on the pattern of specialization.
Panel(2c) in Figure (2) shows that, as North’s educational institutions improve, it
exports relatively more high-skill goods, while South exports relatively more low-
skill goods. Stated differently, North specializes in high-skill sectors, and South
specializes in the low-skill sectors.
This example demonstrates that differences in educational institutions across
countries can be a source of comparative advantage. Countries with more robust
educational institutions are more capable of providing skilled labor and more likely
to specialize in high-skill sectors. Educational policies not only serve as vehicles to
combat inequality, but can also be used as instruments in trade policies.
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Table 2: Common Parameters
Parameters Value
Elasticity of substitution across sector: σ 2.2
Elasticity of substitution within sector: η 2.7
Elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital: ρ 0.67
Trade Elasticity: θ 4
Rate of capital depreciation: δ 0.05
Probability of death: ζ 0.025
Discount factor: β 0.98
Factor shares: αj and δj the U.S. data
4 Parameterization
Model parameters are either taken from the literature, estimated, or calibrated to the
base year. Using data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), as discussed
in Timmer et al. (2015), I calibrate the parameters of mymodel tomatch observations
in the year 2000. I assume the world is in a steady state at year 2000. The model is
calibrated based on 40 countries and 6 sectors aggregated from 33 industries5 using
bilateral trade data from World Input-Output Table (WIOT) and production data
from Socio-economic Accounts (SEA). Table (5) and (6) in Appendix (A) provide the
lists of countries and industries.
4.1 Common Parameters
In this section, I assume the following parameters are common across countries,
elasticities, factor shares for each industry, constant probability of death, discount
factor, and the rate of capital depreciation.
Following the estimation of Simonovska and Waugh (2014) trade elasticity is set
to θ = 4. I set elasticity of substitution within sector η = 2.7, and across sectorσ = 2.2
to match the median 5-digit SITC and 3-digit elasticity of substitution between 1990
and 2001 estimated by Broda andWeinstein (2006). The elasticity of substitution be-
tween skilled labor and capital is set to ρ = 0.67 following the estimation of Krusell
et al. (2000). I set the constant probability of death ζ = 0.025, such that workers stay
5See Table (7) for the details of aggregation.
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in labor force for 40 years on average. Lastly, the capital depreciation rate is set to
δ = 0.05 and the discount factor is set to β = 0.98.
For the factor shares, I assume αji and δ
j
i are the same across all countries, but are
different across industries. Using U.S. data in year 2000 from SEA as the baseline,
I compute the expenditure shares of capital, skilled, and unskilled labor for each
industry. I set αji to match the expenditure share on unskilled labor and δ
j
i to match
the expenditure share on skilled labor relative to capital for each industry. See Table
(8) in Appendix (A) for the values of factor shares for each industry.
4.2 Country-specific Parameters and Iceberg Trade Costs
SEA records the number of employees in the production process for each country,
and I use this variable as the total labor force Li. The SEA dataset also enables me
to compute relative skill supply, skill premium, and nominal wages for skilled and
unskilled labor. See Appendix (C) for further details.
I use the gravity structure from my model to estimate productivity and iceberg
trade costs. First taking log to gravity equation (26), I get
logEji,n,t = log T
j
i,t − θd
j
i,n,t − θc
j
i,t + log
(
Ejn,t/Φ
j
n,t
)
. (33)
I assume that trade costs take the form
dji,n = (Disti,n)
bj1 × exp(bj2 × borderi,n + b
j
3 × languagei,n + b
j
4 × colonyi,n) (34)
for all i, n. This specification proxies the geographical barriers. Disti,n is the dis-
tance between i and n, and I set Di,i = 1. borderi,n = 1 if i and n do not share
border. Similarly, languagei,n and colonyi,n refer, respectively to whether i and n
share a language, and whether they share colonial history. The data on the geogra-
phy and trade barriers for each country pair are from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives
et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Combine the specification of trade costs
with the gravity equation, the empirical specification is given by:
logEji,n =b
′j
1 logDi,n + b
′j
2 × borderi,n + b
′j
3 × languagei,n + b
′j
4 × colonyi,n
+ Exporterji + Importer
j
n + ε
j
i,n, (35)
where Exporterji and Importer
j
n are the exporter and importer dummies, respec-
tively. I estimate equation (35) industry-by-industry using fixed effectsmodel. Given
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the value of trade elasticity θ, the parameters about iceberg trade costs for each in-
dustry can be calculated by bj = −θbˆ′
j
. See Table (9) in the Appendix (C) for the
estimated parameters for trade costs. The productivity can be recovered by the esti-
mated exporter fixed effect
Tˆ ji = exp(
ˆExporter
j
i )(c
j
i,t)
θ. (36)
Following equations (11) and (10), the unit bundle cost cji,t is a function of factor
prices, factor shares, and elasticity ρ and θ. Imposing an interest rate of r = 0.06,
and combing it with wages from SEA and calibrated parameters, the unit cost cji,t
of each j and each i can be calculated. The parameters for productivity for each
country and each sector are computed.
4.3 Educational Institution
Figure 3: Educational institution γi
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The only remaining unspecified parameter is the educational institution γi for each
country. The educational institution γi is calibrated such that the steady-state skill
premium in the model matches the skill premium in the data for each country. De-
tails of the calibration procedure can be found in Appendix (E).
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Figure (3) illustrates the calibrated value of educational institutions for each
country. In general, more developed countries have more efficient educational in-
stitutions, while less developed countries have less efficient education institutions.
Countries with themost efficient educational institutions are Europeanwelfare states
such as Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. Large developing countries such as In-
donesia and India have the least efficient education institutions.
To compare with other measurements on the quality of educational institutions
across countries, Figure (4) shows calibrated educational institution and Program
for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores in math and reading in 2003.
The PISA score is themost commonly usedmeasure for global educational rankings,
although this measure is not without criticism6. The calibrated educational institu-
tion score is positively correlated with PISA score in both mathematics and reading
(see Table (3)). Similar to Yeaple and Xiang (2017), this paper uses a general equilib-
rium framework to quantify the quality of educational institutions across countries.
The aspect of the educational institution featured in this model is the opportunity
to access education.
Table 3: Correlations between calibrated educational institution and PISA scores.
PISA score in math (2003) PISA scroe in reading(2003)
Correlation Coef. Rank Corr. Correlation Coef. Rank Corr.
Calibrated γi 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.80
Note: The correlation coef. is Pearson correlation coefficient. The rank corr. is Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient.
4.4 Model Fit
I use the calibrated parameters to compute the steady state of the model. The model
matches target data well. Figure (5) plots the skill premium and relative skill supply
in the data and the calibrated model. The skill premium is my targeted moment,
and the model matches the data almost perfectly, with the correlation of 1. For the
relative skill supply, the correlation between my model and the data is 0.6. Figure
(5) shows that there is a negative relationship between the skill premium and the
6See Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) and Yeaple and Xiang (2017)
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Figure 4: Calibrated Educational Institution γi and PISA scores
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Figure 5: Model fit: Skill premium and relative skill supply
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relative skill supply in the data, with a correlation coefficient of -0.59. The model
preserves this negative relationship, with a correlation coefficient of -0.83. In sum-
mary, the model matches the skill premium perfectly, preserving the relationship
between skill premium and relative skill supply shown in the data.
5 Counterfactual: Trade Liberalization
In this section, I study the effect of an unanticipated permanent trade liberalization.
The trade liberalization corresponds to a uniform reduction in iceberg trade costs.
At period t = 0, the economy begins in a calibrated steady state. At periodt = 1,
iceberg trade costs fall by 25% for each country pair and each sector. That is
dji,n,t = (d
j
i,n,0 − 1)× (1− 0.25) + 1, ∀i, n ∈ N, j ∈ J and t = 1, 2, . . . . (37)
I compute the transitional path for all countries and quantify interactions between
educational outcome, labor market, and international trade. Solving the transitional
path for all 40 countries simultaneously is a daunting task since it involves finding
solutions in a vast state space. I adapt the algorithm of Alvarez and Lucas (2007)
to this dynamic framework by framing the problem as a finite horizon problem.
The method I use is efficient, as the computation of the full transitional path takes
around 2 minutes on my laptop. See Appendix (D) for details of the algorithm.
5.1 Educational Outcomes
Figure (6) plots the percentage change in the relative skill supply and the skill pre-
mium relative to the baseline for each country. The skill premium and the skill share
rise by 0.93% and 1.71% on average, respectively, but vary widely across countries.
The skill premium rises by as much as 1.32% in Brazil, 1.35% in India and 1.40% in
Indonesia, and by as little as 0.37% in Canada and 0.35% in Belgium. The skill share
rises by as much as 2.02% in Russia, 1.96% in India and 1.89% in China, and by as
little as 0.87% in Taiwan, 0.85% in Japan and 0.73% in Belgium. Note that contrary to
the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the skill premium rises in all coun-
tries. For both developed and developing countries, workers with higher education
levels gain more from trade, resulting in growing inequality between education cat-
egories. This result suggests that capital-skill complementarity is the dominant force
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Figure 6: Changes (%) in skill premium and relative skill supply resulting from trade
liberalization in the steady state.
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in shaping educational outcome and inequality. Relative skill supply changes in the
same direction as skill premium, and changes in the educational outcome in a steady
state reflect movement along a positively sloped relative skill supply curve.
Figure (7) depicts a clear negative correlation between predicted change in skill
premium in this counterfactual and educational institutions, with a correlation coef-
ficient of -0.6. A more robust educational institution indicates that it is less frictional
to accumulate human capital in the long run. Since individuals make education de-
cisions by evaluating the relative reward between being a skilled or an unskilled
worker, a more robust educational institution makes a country’s economy less sus-
ceptible to intensifying inequality under trade shocks.
Figure (8) illustrates the transitional paths of skill premium and relative skill sup-
ply in the United States. The skill premium rises rapidly after trade liberalization,
and peaks at t = 6. As shown in Figure (8), the skill premium increases by 1.25% at
the peak. Older generations cannot adjust their education status, resulting in a slow
adjustment of human capital is slow. Relative skill supply climbs slowly along the
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Figure 7: Changes (%) in the skill premium resulting from the trade liberalization
and the educational institution.
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transitional path after trade liberalization. As demonstrated in Figure (8), this leads
to an eventual 1.26% increase in relative skill supply. In the long run, the adjustment
of human capital affects the skill premium; as more people become skilled workers,
the skill premium falls and converges to the new steady state following the trade
liberalization. At the new steady state, the skill premium rises by 0.57%; human
capital accumulation eliminates 54% of the increased skill premium from the peak
in the United States. The transitional paths of other countries are similar to that of
the United States.
In summary, trade liberalization raises inequality between educational categories
and educational attainment. In general, countries with more robust educational in-
stitutions are less affected by intensifying inequality. Inequality is most severe in
the early stage of transition following trade liberalization, and decreases as future
generations accumulate more human capital. The freedom to pursue an education
removes more than half of the transitory inequality.
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Figure 8: Transitional paths for the changes (%) in the skill premium and the skill
share in the U.S. resulting from the trade liberalization.
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5.2 Channels on the Transition Path
There are two main components of the model: physical capital accumulation and
human capital accumulation. The interaction between these two components drives
the transitional behavior of the economy in each country. By turning each compo-
nent on and off, I can isolate and investigate different channels at work.
First, I compute the baseline steady-state equilibrium using the calibrated pa-
rameters and collect the steady-state capital and skill supply. To turn off capital
accumulation under trade shocks, I force capital supply to be at the baseline steady-
state level while computing the full transitional path. Human capital accumulation
is turned off in a similar manner.
In the short run, all factors are not able to adjust. Turning off both capital and hu-
man capital accumulation illustrate the economic consequence in the short run. At
this stage, the outcome is driven by the comparative advantage channel (C-A). The
skill premium rises in countries with a comparative advantage in high-skill sectors,
and falls in countries with a comparative advantage in low-skill sectors. Since phys-
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ical capital adjusts faster than human capital, allowing capital accumulation accen-
tuates the economic impact in the medium run. In the medium run, active channels
include comparative advantage and capital accumulation. In this stage, because
capital becomes cheaper under trade liberalization, the representative household
invests more intensively in capital, and the complementarity between capital and
skilled labor raises the skill premium. Lastly, in the long run, all factors can freely
adjust and all components are active. The long run features all channels, includes
comparative advantage, capital accumulation, and education. At this stage, human
capital accumulation catches up with the accumulation of physical capital, and it
dampens trade-induced inequality. Active and inactive channels under different
scenarios are briefly summarized in Table (4).
Figure (9) shows the decomposition of the transitional path of the skill premium
inMexico following trade liberalization. When all components are inactive, the skill
premium drops, which is driven by the comparative advantage mechanism. This
explains the initial drop in skill premium at t = 1 along the transitional path. When
only capital accumulation is active, the initial drop in the skill premium is preserved.
The dramatic rise in the skill premium reflects the rapid capital accumulation and
the skill-capital complementarity. In this case, the lack of educational choice makes
the steady-state skill premium higher than the peak on the transitional path. When
all components are active, education channel neutralizes the effect of capital accu-
mulation on skill premium. As a result, the skill premium falls along the transitional
path, but the eventual skill premium is still higher than in the baseline.
A similar pattern in the transition of skill premium following trade liberaliza-
tion has been documented in the data. For example, Mexico joined the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1986. As a result, trade barriers were sub-
Table 4: Components in the model and the corresponding active channels
Cases
Factor Supply Active Channel
Skill Capital C-A SBTC Education
(1) Short-run ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
(2) Medium-run ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
(3) Long-run ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Figure 9: Decompostition of the changes in the skill premium resulting from the
trade liberalization.
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stantially reduced in the country.Atolia and Kurokawa (2016) show that although
the skill premium in Mexico rose rapidly between 1986 to 1994, it subsequently de-
clined over a long period of time. This pattern has been observed in Korea after
trade liberalization in 1970s , and in China after joining World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 20027, and in China after joining World Trade Organization (WTO) in
20028. These observations indicate that physical capital and human capital accumu-
lation are crucial in shaping the transition of wage inequality between educational
categories. Ignoring these channels exaggerates changes in inequality and does not
offer an explanation for the rich dynamic following trade shocks.
5.3 Education and Trade-Induced Inequality
Figure (10) and Table (13) record percentage changes in the skill premium for all
countries and all cases. When only the comparative advantage channel is active, the
7See Kim and Topel (2007).
8See Figure (12) in the Appendix (B).
26
Figure 10: Changes(%) in the skill premium resulting from the trade liberalization
for the long-run and the medium cases.
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skill premium drops in 32 out of 40 countries. Capital-skill complementarity domi-
nates in all countries, resulting in an eventual skill premium rise in all countries. The
difference in skill premium between case (2) and case (3) is globalization-induced
inequality eliminated by education. Education eliminates 57.3% to 73.0% of trade-
induced inequality, with an average rate of 64.5%. This quantitative analysis sug-
gests that education can be a very effective instrument in combating trade-induced
inequality.
5.4 Gains from Trade and Intergenerational Inequality
Table (12) shows the percentage change in real wages for all educational categories
and all countries in a steady state. We can see that both skilled and unskilled labor
gain from trade liberalization in all countries. Mean real wages rise by as much as
35.4% in Indonesia, 32.6% in Brazil, and by as little as 13.0% in Canada and 12.9% in
Belgium. The average mean real wage rise is 24.5%.
Contrary to the traditional static trademodel, the dynamic structure ofmy frame-
work allows me to further explore the distribution of gains from trade across dif-
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Figure 11: Changes in lifetime earnings(%) for each generation and each educational
category resulting from the trade liberalization.
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ferent generations and educational categories. Let W ei,t be the lifetime earnings
for the group born at time t in country i with educational category e, where e ∈
{skilled, unskilled} and
W ei,t =
∞∑
s=0
νs
(
wei,t+s
Pi,t+s
)
. (38)
I calculate the lifetime earnings for each group under the baseline steady state
and the transitional path under trade liberalization. The percentage difference in
W ei,t relative to the baseline captures the welfare gains for each group
Figure (11) depicts the percentage change in lifetime earning relative to the base-
line for each generation and educational category in the United States. For all gen-
erations, skilled workers gain more from trade relative to unskilled workers. For
skilled workers, the educated group born at t = 5 gains the most from globalization.
This group is able to enjoy the above new steady-state skill premium for the most
of their lifetime. The educated groups born after t = 5 can still enjoy the above-
steady-state skill premium; however, as skill premium approaches the new steady
28
state, there is less room for future educated generations to take advantage of. The
educated groups born before t = 5 gain relatively less from globalization, because
for the first few periods after trade liberalization, the skill premium adjusts from the
baseline steady state, which is below the new steady-state level. For uneducated
workers, the oldest group gains the least. Subsequent generations gain relatively
more, but never reach the gains of educated workers. Other countries show similar
patterns in the distribution of welfare to that of the United States.
In summary, trade liberalization favors the older and educated group the most,
and subsequent groups do not gain as much. The group which gains the least is the
oldest and uneducated group. These results show that the distribution of gains from
trade not only is unequal across education categories, but is also unequal across
generations. In addition, the results suggest that globalization can be a potential
cause of rising intergenerational inequality.
6 Conclusion
I find that the transitional dynamics of trade-induced inequality are closely related
to adjustments in the factor supply. Upon an unanticipated trade liberalization,
both capital and skill supply do not respond to the shock immediately. In the short-
run, comparative advantage is the main driving force that shifts relative demand
to skilled labor, resulting in changes in the skill premium. Since the adjustment of
physical capital is more flexible than education, the subsequent stage of the eco-
nomic transition mostly reflects the capital accumulation. Moreover, because trade
liberalization reduces the cost of physical capital, investment takes placemore inten-
sively. The skill-capital complementarity and abundant supply of capital increase
the productivity of skilled workers, resulting in a widening wage gap among skilled
and unskilled labor. In the long run, newly-born generationsmake educational deci-
sions based on prospects of the future economy, and they gradually replace old gen-
erations in the existing population. The gradual change in the skill supply shapes
the eventual outcome of inequality. This quantitative result is consistent with obser-
vations of recent trade liberalization in Mexico, Korea, and China.
The analysis on the dynamic of the economy indicates that education is an effec-
tive mean of combating globalization-induced inequality. The slow adjustment in
the supply of human capital eventually reduces trade-induced inequality. Further-
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more, the quality of educational institutions is also a source of comparative advan-
tage. A countrywithmore robust educational institutions is more likely to specialize
in skill-intensive goods.
This framework provides implications for intergenerational distribution of gains
from trade. Elderly educated generations benefit the most from globalization, as
they can fully exploit the above-the-new-steady-state skill premium in earlier stage
of their lives. Young educated generations enjoy substantial gains from trade, but
not as much as their educated older counterparts as the economy becomes more sta-
bilized. Old and uneducated groups gain the least from globalization because they
experience the largest income gap between skilled and unskilled workers following
trade liberalization. Recently, there has been much discussion in policy and press
circles about rising intergenerational inequality. My analysis offers a different per-
spective to view this issue — it suggests that globalization can be a potential cause
for intergenerational inequality.
This tractable framework can be used to address broader questions about both
trade and education policies. Many developing countries have implemented poli-
cies aiming to promote higher educational attainment and increased exports at the
same time. As my model shows, improving the quality of educational institutions
in countries with a comparative advantage in low-skill sectors can reduce exports,
which could result in trade-offs between education and exports. My framework also
offers a tool for policy makers to carefully design and examine possible interactions
among trade and educational policies, and in turn make more informed decisions.
For future research, this framework can be extended and applied to different eco-
nomic issues. For example, by applying my model to province- or state-level data,
differences in educational institutions across various locations can be investigated.
This type of comparison is vital for the educational administration to allocate lim-
ited resources across different locations within a countrymore efficiently. Retraining
programs such as Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in the United States provides
opportunities for workers to retrain and gain additional work-related skills. Intro-
ducing retraining to this model can help in analyzing economic benefits of the TAA
program, and relevant effects on trade patterns and transitory costs of inequality.
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A Tables
Table 5: List of countries
ISO Code Country Name ISO Code Country Name
AUS Australia JPN Japan
AUT Austria KOR Republic of Korea
BEL Belgium LVA Latvia
BRA Brazil LTU Lithuania
BGR Bulgaria LUX Luxembourg
CAN Canada MLT Malta
CHN China MEX Mexico
CYP Cyprus NLD Netherlands
CZE Czech Republic POL Poland
DNK Denmark PRT Portugal
EST Estonia ROU Romania
FIN Finland RUS Russia
FRA France SVK Slovak Republic
DEU Germany SVN Slovenia
GRC Greece ESP Spain
HUN Hungary SWE Sweden
IND India TWN Taiwan
IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey
IRL Ireland GBR United Kingdom
ITA Italy USA United States
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Table 6: Sector Codes in the World Input-Output Database
Industry code Description
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
C Mining and Quarrying
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products
25 Rubber and Plastics
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
29 Machinery, Nec
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment
34t35 Transport equipment
36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
F Construction
50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles Retail Sale of Fuel
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles
52 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles ; Repair of Household Goods
H Hotels and Restaurants
60 Inland Transport
61 Water Transport
62 Air Transport
63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities;
Activities of Travel Agencies
64 Post and Telecommunications
J Financial Intermediation
70 Real Estate Activities
71t74 Renting of M& Eq and Other Business Activities
L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
M Education
N Health and Social Work
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Table 7: Industry Correspondence
Category Industry Description
Agriculture, food and mining AtB, 15t16, C
Machinery 29, 36t37, 34t35
High-skill manufacturing 24, 30t33
Low-skill manufacturing 21t22, 23, 25, 17t18, 19, 20, 26, 27t28
Low-skill service 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, H, F
Professional service J, 70, 71t74, L, M, N
Table 8: Sector Characteristic
Share on LL Share on LH relative to K
Sector (αj) (δj)
Agriculture, food and mining 0.32 0.19
High-skill manufacturing 0.32 0.49
Low-skill manufacturing 0.43 0.33
Low-skill service 0.51 0.34
Machinery 0.47 0.39
Professional Service 0.27 0.44
Note: The U.S. data in year 2000 is used as baseline.
Table 9: Estimation of Iceberg Trade Cost
Industry log distance border common official language colonial
Agriculture,food and mining -0.74 0.79 0.78 0.67
High-skill manufacturing -0.51 0.82 0.58 0.45
Low-skill manufacturing -0.65 1.00 0.83 0.52
Low-skill service -0.79 -0.10 0.92 0.51
Machinery -0.55 0.72 0.74 0.48
Professional -0.77 -0.56 1.28 -0.19
Note: The parameters are estimated using data of year 2000 fromWIOT.
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Table 10: Country Characteristics (year 2000)
Skill Premium Relative Skill Supply Labor Force Educational Institution
Country (wHi /w
L
i ) (L
H
i /L
L
i ) (millions) (γi)
AUS 2.26 0.17 9.13 0.72
AUT 1.75 0.19 3.96 1.12
BEL 1.59 0.20 4.16 1.37
BGR 2.30 0.08 3.22 0.63
BRA 3.22 0.14 79.54 0.38
CAN 1.53 0.26 15.20 1.43
CHN 2.27 0.04 730.25 0.60
CYP 1.89 0.40 0.32 0.96
CZE 1.97 0.14 4.96 0.85
DEU 1.71 0.31 39.32 1.14
DNK 1.34 0.37 2.74 2.00
ESP 1.77 0.39 16.93 1.06
EST 1.81 0.46 0.58 0.98
FIN 1.41 0.47 2.32 1.73
FRA 1.80 0.35 24.76 1.06
GBR 1.65 0.42 29.92 1.28
GRC 2.18 0.22 4.26 0.73
HUN 2.35 0.19 4.23 0.66
IDN 3.74 0.06 93.44 0.30
IND 4.67 0.06 432.38 0.23
IRL 1.54 0.33 1.75 1.57
ITA 1.97 0.13 23.39 0.86
JPN 1.63 0.31 64.76 1.23
KOR 1.69 0.72 21.56 1.13
LTU 1.87 0.35 1.35 0.91
LUX 1.73 0.26 0.28 1.26
LVA 2.07 0.28 0.95 0.76
MEX 2.93 0.14 40.10 0.45
MLT 2.29 0.11 0.15 0.72
NLD 1.59 0.29 8.28 1.38
POL 1.86 0.16 14.20 0.94
PRT 2.96 0.08 5.12 0.47
ROU 2.15 0.05 10.66 0.70
RUS 2.35 0.14 74.73 0.56
SVK 1.74 0.16 2.04 1.05
SVN 2.27 0.18 0.91 0.71
SWE 1.34 0.33 4.39 1.98
TUR 3.38 0.10 21.52 0.37
TWN 1.86 0.32 9.38 0.98
USA 1.93 0.43 146.82 0.94
Average 2.11 0.25 48.85 0.95
Note: See the Appendix (C) for the detail of the calculation.
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Table 11: The Baseline Equilibrium in the Steady State
Skill Skill Real Wages Relative to real wage of USA
Premium Share Skilled Unskilled Avg
Country wHi /w
L
i L
H
i /L
L
i w
H
i /Pi w
L
i /Pi wi/Pi
AUS 2.26 0.54 133.03 58.84 72.65
AUT 1.75 0.70 229.80 131.46 155.76
BEL 1.59 0.79 359.35 226.00 263.38
BGR 2.30 0.44 27.66 12.03 14.47
BRA 3.22 0.30 22.29 6.92 8.52
CAN 1.53 0.78 244.53 159.95 183.55
CHN 2.27 0.40 6.56 2.89 3.41
CYP 1.89 0.64 220.57 116.74 140.02
CZE 1.97 0.56 69.81 35.36 42.22
DEU 1.71 0.69 174.29 102.21 119.89
DNK 1.34 0.93 195.81 145.72 162.59
ESP 1.77 0.66 114.46 64.80 76.49
EST 1.81 0.61 63.92 35.33 41.57
FIN 1.41 0.86 185.66 131.66 148.40
FRA 1.80 0.68 186.15 103.43 123.21
GBR 1.65 0.77 179.16 108.54 127.66
GRC 2.18 0.52 102.19 46.95 56.95
HUN 2.35 0.50 72.55 30.87 38.02
IDN 3.74 0.25 10.38 2.78 3.42
IND 4.67 0.20 8.99 1.92 2.40
IRL 1.54 0.91 269.57 175.20 204.76
ITA 1.97 0.58 166.41 84.26 101.04
JPN 1.63 0.71 141.71 86.78 100.74
KOR 1.69 0.67 86.26 50.90 59.41
LTU 1.87 0.57 48.72 26.12 30.75
LUX 1.73 0.83 562.73 326.02 392.65
LVA 2.07 0.51 51.36 24.76 29.56
MEX 2.93 0.36 52.56 17.96 22.20
MLT 2.29 0.55 226.66 99.00 123.01
NLD 1.59 0.80 212.55 134.04 156.10
POL 1.86 0.60 67.28 36.15 42.80
PRT 2.96 0.39 141.74 47.82 60.28
ROU 2.15 0.47 25.60 11.89 14.19
RUS 2.35 0.38 17.56 7.49 8.85
SVK 1.74 0.63 57.19 32.95 38.46
SVN 2.27 0.53 153.04 67.49 83.06
SWE 1.34 0.91 159.92 119.69 133.04
TUR 3.38 0.30 39.18 11.58 14.41
TWN 1.86 0.64 123.49 66.43 79.26
USA 1.93 0.64 159.69 82.79 100.00
Average 2.11 0.59 134.26 75.84 89.48
Note: All real wages are relative to the U.S. average real wage. And the U.S. average real wage is normalized to 100.
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Table 12: Counterfactual Changes(%) Resulting from Trade Liberalization
Skill Skill Capital Real Wage Real Wage Average Real Income
Premium Share Supply for Skilled for Unskilled Real Wage per Capita
Country (wHi /w
L
i ) (L
H
i /L
L
i ) (Ki) (w
H
i /Pi) (w
L
i /Pi) (wi/Pi) (Yi/Pi)
AUS 0.81 1.29 23.53 30.45 29.40 29.98 28.85
AUT 0.50 0.96 14.92 20.75 20.15 20.48 19.74
BEL 0.35 0.73 8.63 13.26 12.86 13.08 12.47
BGR 1.07 1.76 23.57 28.90 27.54 28.23 27.03
BRA 1.32 1.91 28.70 34.39 32.63 33.51 32.27
CAN 0.37 0.82 9.19 13.46 13.04 13.26 12.57
CHN 1.12 1.89 26.32 32.78 31.31 32.01 30.41
CYP 0.69 1.23 19.88 26.73 25.86 26.34 25.33
CZE 0.71 1.25 18.99 24.61 23.73 24.20 23.23
DEU 0.45 0.88 15.74 21.24 20.70 20.99 20.25
DNK 0.45 1.19 19.21 24.73 24.17 24.48 23.63
ESP 0.64 1.23 20.32 26.27 25.47 25.90 24.96
EST 0.84 1.59 21.31 27.00 25.94 26.50 25.34
FIN 0.53 1.31 14.87 21.64 21.00 21.35 20.41
FRA 0.48 0.89 17.03 22.29 21.71 22.03 21.30
GBR 0.49 0.99 17.29 22.96 22.35 22.69 21.91
GRC 0.80 1.32 20.88 27.35 26.34 26.88 25.78
HUN 0.72 1.13 20.99 26.69 25.79 26.28 25.28
IDN 1.40 1.96 29.14 35.38 33.51 34.41 32.93
IND 1.35 1.80 26.75 32.54 30.77 31.63 30.25
IRL 0.64 1.37 11.61 18.45 17.69 18.13 17.19
ITA 0.53 0.92 18.35 25.00 24.35 24.70 23.81
JPN 0.41 0.85 16.32 23.70 23.19 23.46 22.50
KOR 0.56 1.11 17.71 24.92 24.23 24.60 23.47
LTU 0.92 1.71 21.87 27.69 26.52 27.12 25.89
LUX 0.55 1.04 8.96 14.78 14.15 14.52 13.88
LVA 1.00 1.72 22.19 28.23 26.96 27.61 26.38
MEX 0.71 1.05 22.09 27.89 26.98 27.45 26.43
MLT 0.60 0.95 19.37 25.64 24.89 25.31 24.42
NLD 0.50 1.04 15.01 20.27 19.68 20.01 19.20
POL 0.74 1.36 20.16 25.40 24.48 24.97 24.01
PRT 0.74 1.06 19.65 26.33 25.40 25.90 24.91
ROU 0.93 1.59 24.31 30.30 29.10 29.71 28.47
RUS 1.21 2.02 26.95 31.96 30.38 31.13 29.97
SVK 0.79 1.54 18.50 24.54 23.56 24.07 22.91
SVN 0.63 1.01 17.55 23.91 23.13 23.55 22.63
SWE 0.44 1.19 17.99 24.76 24.21 24.51 23.61
TUR 1.09 1.54 23.98 29.53 28.14 28.84 27.73
TWN 0.48 0.87 17.29 24.30 23.71 24.03 23.01
USA 0.57 1.00 18.70 25.60 24.88 25.28 24.37
Average 0.73 1.28 19.40 25.41 24.50 24.98 23.97
Note: Numbers are in %.
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Table 13: Decomposition of Changes in Skill Premium(%) resulting from Trade Lib-
eralization
Changes in Skill Premium (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Short-run Medium-run Long-run | (2)−(3)
(2)
| × 100
AUS -0.15 2.09 0.81 61.44
AUT 0.15 1.47 0.50 65.79
BEL 0.25 1.11 0.35 68.24
BGR -0.11 2.85 1.07 62.36
BRA -0.27 3.26 1.32 59.36
CAN 0.14 1.22 0.37 69.50
CHN -0.51 3.03 1.12 63.01
CYP 0.01 1.91 0.69 64.12
CZE -0.10 1.97 0.71 64.02
DEU -0.12 1.34 0.45 66.73
DNK -0.18 1.64 0.45 72.74
ESP -0.14 1.87 0.64 65.66
EST -0.11 2.45 0.84 65.59
FIN 0.44 1.83 0.53 71.07
FRA -0.17 1.38 0.48 65.49
GBR -0.04 1.49 0.49 66.83
GRC -0.11 2.12 0.80 62.37
HUN -0.26 1.86 0.72 61.49
IDN -0.32 3.38 1.40 58.63
IND -0.28 3.16 1.35 57.37
IRL 0.85 1.99 0.64 67.68
ITA -0.21 1.47 0.53 64.11
JPN -0.20 1.28 0.41 67.72
KOR -0.13 1.68 0.56 66.62
LTU -0.07 2.64 0.92 65.21
LUX 0.79 1.57 0.55 65.00
LVA -0.04 2.73 1.00 63.38
MEX -0.62 1.79 0.71 60.06
MLT -0.16 1.57 0.60 61.53
NLD 0.03 1.55 0.50 67.84
POL -0.13 2.11 0.74 65.00
PRT -0.09 1.81 0.74 59.23
ROU -0.36 2.53 0.93 63.02
RUS -0.56 3.28 1.21 63.14
SVK 0.15 2.33 0.79 66.21
SVN -0.02 1.66 0.63 61.89
SWE 0.05 1.62 0.44 72.96
TUR -0.27 2.66 1.09 59.19
TWN -0.27 1.37 0.48 65.17
USA -0.02 1.57 0.57 63.81
Average -0.08 2.02 0.73 64.51
Note: Column (4) records the proportion of trade induced inequality reduced by education.
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B Figures
Figure 12: Changes(%) in Chinese skill premium using year 2000 as baseline, 2000-
2011.
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CHN, base year = 2000.
Note: The skill premium is computed using data from Social Economic Account in WIOD.
See the Appendix (C) for the details.
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C Data
The relative skill supply and skill premium in each country are computed using
Social Economic Account(SEA) fromWIOD.
Relative Skill Supply
SEA records the share of total hours worked by high skilled, medium skilled and
low skilled workers over 15 years old (H HS,H MS andH LS) to compute relative
skill supply. Which is given by
Relative Skill Supplydatai =
H HSi
H MSi +H LSi
Skill Premium
I combine additional data on the share of total labor compensation to high skilled,
medium skilled and low skilled workers over 15 years old (LABHS, LABMS and
LABLS) to compute skill premium. Which is given by
Skill Premiumdatai =
LABHSi/H HSi
(LABMSi + LABLSi)/(H MSi +H LSi)
Labor Force
I use number of persons engaged (EMP ) as total labor force in each country.
Nominal Wages
SEA records total labor compensation (LAB) for each country. The nominal wage
for each country is calculated by LAB/EMP (in national currency). I use exchange
rate at June 30, 20009 to convert nominal income to US dollars.
Wages for skilled and unskilled workers are computed by combining informa-
tion on nominal wage, skill premium and relative skill supply ion each country.
Which are given by
wL,datai =
[
skill premiumdatai
1 + (relative skill supplydatai )
−1
+ (1 + relative skill supplydatai )
−1
]−1
× wdatai
wH,datai = w
L,data
i × skill premium
data
i .
9Source: https://openexchangerates.org
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D Solution Algorithms
In this section, I describe the algorithm for computing both steady state and tran-
sitional path. The technique to solve the model is built upon Alvarez and Lucas
(2007). The goal is to find sequence of factor prices such that the resulting educa-
tional choice is optimal, Euler equations are satisfied and factor markets are cleared.
D.1 Computing the Steady State
Let x(τ) be the τ th round of iteration of variable x. First, start with initial guess
of steady state wages such that wHi (0) > w
L
i (0) for all i and guess of capital rent
ri(0) > 0, capital stockKi(0) > 0. Then follow the below procedure:
1. Update Skill Supply
Use wHi (τ) and w
L
i (τ) to find ability threshold
10:
a¯i(τ) =
[
1−
(wLi (τ)
wHi (τ)
)]−1/γi
, ∀i
Use a¯i(τ) to get skilled and unskilled labor supply
11
LHi (τ) =
µ(a¯i(τ), γi)
ζ
× Li, ∀i
LLi (τ) =
G(a¯i(τ)
ζ
× Li, ∀i.
2. Update Trade Share and the Price Indices
Scale factor prices such that:
N∑
i=1
[
wHi (τ)L
H
i (τ) + w
L
i (τ)L
L
i (τ) + ri(τ)Ki(τ)
]
= 1
Compute unit cost for each i and each j:
pj,Mi (τ) =
[
δji (w
H
i (τ))
1−ρ + (1− δji )(ri(τ))
1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ
cji (τ) = [w
L
i (τ)]
αji [pM,ji (τ)]
1−αji
10The ability threshold in steady state is derived by dropping all time subscript t in equation (2).
11µ(a¯, γ) =
∫∞
a¯
[1− 1/xγ ]dG(x) is used to simplify notation.
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Compute bilateral trade share:
piji,n(τ) =
T ji [d
j
n,ic
j
i (τ)]
−θ∑N
k=1 T
j
k [d
j
n,kc
j
k(τ)]
−θ
=
T ji [d
j
n,ic
j
i (τ)]
−θ
Φjn(τ)
Compute sectoral price indices:
pjn(τ) = C[Φ
j
n(τ)]
− 1
θ
where C = Γ
(
θ+1−η
θ
) 1
1−η
.
Compute CPI:
Pn(τ) =
[ J∑
j=1
(
pjn(τ)
)1−σ] 11−σ
3. Update Capital Supply
In the steady state, nominal rent satisfies:
ri = Pi × [ν
−1 − (1− δ)]
Denote the total nominal income by
Wn(τ) = w
H
n (τ)L
H
n (τ) + w
L
n (τ)L
L
n(τ) + rn(τ)Kn(τ)
Compute total expenditure on sector j for each country:
Xjn(τ) =
( pjn(τ)
Pn(τ)
)1−σ
×Wn(τ).
Utilize this to compute the average expenditure share on capital in for each
country:
average capital share′i(τ) =
∑J
j=1
[
(1− αji )(1− δ
j
i )
(
ri(τ)
pj,Mi (τ)
)1−ρ∑N
n=1 pi
j
i,n(τ)X
j
n(τ)
]
∑J
j=1
∑N
n=1 pi
j
i,n(τ)X
j
n(τ)
Use average capital share and the condition for the nominal capital rent in the
steady state to update capital stock:
Ki(τ + 1) =
1
ν−1 − (1− δ)
×
average capital sharei(τ)×Wi(τ)
Pi(τ)
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4. Compute Excess Demand for Factors
Scale factor prices again, such that
N∑
i=1
[
wHi (τ)L
H
i (τ) + w
L
i (τ)L
L
i (τ) + r
′
i(τ)Ki(τ + 1)
]
= 1
Compute total expenditure on sector j for each country:
Xjn(τ) =
( pjn(τ)
Pn(τ)
)1−σ
× [wHi (τ)L
H
i (τ) + w
L
i (τ)L
L
i (τ) + r
′
i(τ)Ki(τ + 1)].
Then compute excess demand function:
ZLi (τ) =
1
wLi (τ)
{
J∑
j=1
[
αji
N∑
n=1
piji,n(τ)X
j
n(τ)
]
− wLi (τ)L
L
i (τ)
}
ZHi (τ) =
1
wHi (τ)
{
J∑
j=1
[
(1− αji )δ
j
i
(
wHi (τ)
PM,ji (τ)
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
piji,n(τ)X
j
n(τ)
]
− wHi (τ)L
H
i (τ)
}
ZKi (τ) =
1
r′i(τ)
{
J∑
j=1
[
(1− αji )(1− δ
j
i )
(
r′i(τ)
PM,ji (τ)
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
piji,n(τ)X
j
n(τ)
]
− r′i(τ)Ki(τ + 1)
}
5. Update Factor Prices
Update factor prices by:
wHi (τ + 1) = w
H
i (τ)
[
1 + ψ
ZHi (τ)
LHi (τ)
]
, ∀i
wLi (τ + 1) = w
L
i (τ)
[
1 + ψ
ZLi (τ)
LLi (τ)
]
, ∀i,
ri(τ + 1) = ri(τ)
[
1 + ψ
ZKi (τ)
Ki(τ + 1)
]
, ∀i,
where ψ ∈ (0, 1].
6. Check Convergence Stop iteration if:
max
i
{
max
{
||ZHi (τ)||, ||Z
L
i (τ)||, ||Z
K
i (τ)||
}}
< tolerence
Go back to step 1 otherwise.
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D.2 Computing Transitional Path
Consider the transitional path from t = 0, 1, . . . , T + T ∗. The path is split into three
phases: (1) t = 0, the economy is at initial state; (2) the shock takes place at t = 1, and
let t = 1, 2, . . . , T be the transitional phase; (3) t = T + 1, . . . , T + T ∗, is the terminal
phase, such that economy reaches new steady state.
Equilibrium is a path of {wHi,t, w
L
i,t, ri,t, L
H
i,t, L
L
i,t, Ki,t} such that all equilibrium con-
ditions are satisfied. Let xNew be the steady state of the variable x under the new
economic environment. To solve the full transitional path, start with an initial guess
of path on {wHi,t(0), w
L
i,t(0), ri,t(0), L
H
i,t(0), L
L
i,t(0), Ki,t(0)} such that:
t = 0 : paths are set to initial condition.
t = 1, . . . , T : arbitrary guess factor supply and factor prices such that wHi,t(0) >
wLi,t(0).
t = T, . . . , T + T ∗ : paths are set to the new steady state xNew.
Furthermore, assume the economy reaches new steady state for any t > T + T ∗.
Given the initial state, terminal state, and initial guess of prices, the procedure to
solve the transitional path is the following:
1. Update Labor Supply
Use the current guess of factor prices to solve ability thresholds a¯i,t(τ) for t =
1, . . . , T + T ∗:
a¯i,t(τ) =
[
1−
(∏∞
s=1(w
L
i,t+s(τ))
νs∏∞
s=1(w
H
i,t+s(τ))
νs
) 1∑
∞
s=0 ν
s
]−1/γi
=
{
1−
[
T+T ∗−t∏
s=0
(
wLi,t+s(τ)
wHi,t+s(τ)
)νs ∞∏
s=T+T ∗−t+1
(
wL,Newi
wH,Newi
)νs]1−ν}−1/γi
=
{
1−
[
T+T ∗−t∏
s=0
(
wLi,t+s(τ)
wHi,t+s(τ)
)βs(
wL,Newi
wH,Newi
) νT+T∗−1+1
1−ν
]1−ν}−1/γi
Compute skill supply sequentially for t = 1, . . . , T + T ∗:
LHi,t(τ + 1) =(1− ζ)L
H
i,t−1(τ + 1) + ν(a¯i,t(τ), γi)Li
LLi,t(τ + 1) =(1− ζ)L
L
i,t−1(τ + 1) +G(a¯i,t(τ))Li
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2. Update Trade Share and the Price Indices
Scale factor prices such that:
N∑
i=1
[
wHi,t(τ)L
H
i,t(τ + 1) + w
L
i,t(τ)L
L
i,t(τ + 1) + ri,t(τ)Ki,t(τ)
]
= 1, ∀t
Compute unit cost for all i, j, t:
pj,Mi,t (τ) =
[
δji (w
H
i,t(τ))
1−ρ + (1− δji )(ri,t(τ))
1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ
cji,t(τ) = [w
L
i,t(τ)]
αji [pM,ji,t (τ)]
1−αji
Compute bilateral trade share:
piji,n,t(τ) =
T ji,t[d
j
n,i,tc
j
i,t(τ)]
−θ∑N
k=1 T
j
k,t[d
j
n,k,tc
j
k,t(τ)]
−θ
=
T ji,t[d
j
n,i,tc
j
i,t(τ)]
−θ
Φjn,t(τ)
Compute sectoral price indices:
pjn,t(τ) = C[Φ
j
n,t(τ)]
− 1
θ
where C = Γ
(
θ+1−η
θ
) 1
1−η
.
Compute CPI:
Pn,t(τ) =
[ J∑
j=1
(
pjn,t(τ)
)1−σ] 11−σ
3. Update Capital Supply
Compute real investment for all i, t using the current guess on the capital path
Ii,t(τ) = Ki,t+1(τ)− (1− δ)Ki,t(τ)
Use it to construct path of real consumption for representative household
Ci,t(τ) =
wHi,t(τ)L
H
i,t(τ + 1) + w
L
i,t(τ)L
L
i,t(τ + 1) + ri,t(τ)Ki,t(τ)
Pi,t(τ)
− Ii,t(τ)
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The shadow price of real consumption for representative household is
λi,t(τ) =
1
C i,t(τ)
Compute average skill sharei,t(τ) similarly as in computing steady state. Let
Wi,t(τ) = w
H
i,t(τ)L
H
i,t(τ + 1) +w
L
i,t(τ)L
L
i,t(τ + 1) + ri,t(τ)Ki,t(τ). Equation (22) can
be rewritten as
−λi,t−1(τ) + νλi,t(τ)
[average skill sharei,t(τ)Wi,t(τ)/Ki,t(τ + 1)
Pi,t(τ)
+ (1− δ)
]
= 0
Rearrange this equation. Update capital supply by:
Ki,t(τ + 1) =
[
average skill sharei,t(τ)Wi,t(τ)
Pi,t(τ)
][
λi,t−1(τ)
νλi,t(τ)
− (1− δ)
]−1
, t = 2, . . . , T + T ∗
4. Compute Excess Demand for Factors
Scale factor prices again such that:
N∑
i=1
[
wHi,t(τ)L
H
i,t(τ + 1) + w
L
i,t(τ)L
L
i,t(τ + 1) + ri,t(τ)Ki,t(τ + 1)
]
= 1, ∀t
Then compute sectoral total expenditure:
Xjn,t(τ) =
[ pjn,t(τ)
Pn,t(τ)
)1−σ
×
(
wHi,t(τ)L
H
i,t(τ + 1) + w
L
i,t(τ)L
L
i,t(τ + 1) + ri,t(τ)Ki,t(τ + 1)
]
Then compute excess demand function:
ZLi,t(τ) =
1
wLi,t(τ)
J∑
j=1
[
αji,t
N∑
n=1
piji,n,t(τ)X
j
n,t(τ)− w
L
i,t(τ)L
L
i,t(τ)
]
ZHi,t(τ) =
1
wHi,t(τ)
J∑
j=1

(1− αji )δji
(
wHi,t(τ)
PM,ji,t (τ)
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
piji,n,t(τ)X
j
n,t(τ)− w
H
i,t(τ)L
H
i,t(τ)


ZKi,t(τ) =
1
ri,t(τ)
J∑
j=1

(1− αji )(1− δji )
(
ri,t(τ)
PM,ji,t (τ)
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
piji,n,t(τ)X
j
n,t(τ)− ri,t(τ)Ki,t(τ + 1)


5. Update Factor Prices
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Update factor prices for t = 1, . . . , T + T ∗:
wHi,t(τ + 1) = w
H
i,t(τ)
[
1 + ψ
ZHi,t(τ)
LHi,t(τ + 1)
]
wLi,t(τ + 1) = w
L
i,t(τ)
[
1 + ψ
ZLi,t(τ)
LLi,t(τ + 1)
]
ri,t(τ + 1) = ri,t(τ)
[
1 + ψ
ZKi,t(τ)
Ki,t(τ + 1)
]
where ψ ∈ (0, 1].
6. Check Convergence
Stop iteration if:
max
t
{
max
i
{
max
{
||ZHi,t(τ)||, ||Z
L
i,t(τ)||, ||Z
K
i,t(τ)||
}}}
< tolerence.
Go back to step 1 otherwise.
E Calibration of Educational Institution γi
This section discusses the calibration procedure of educational institution γi for each
country. The calibration procedure involves two nested loops. In the outer loop, I
compute the steady state equilibrium given a guess of γi. The inner loop updates
γi such that skill premium in the data is consistent to the ability threshold in the
steady state equilibrium. Let x(τ) be the variable of x at τ th iteration. Start with ar-
bitrary initial guess of education institution {γi(0)}
N
i=1, γi(0) > 0 ∀i. The calibration
procedure is concluded in the following steps,
1. Compute steady state equilibrium using {γi(τ)}
N
i=1. Record ability threshold
in the steady state {a¯i(τ)}
N
i=1.
2. Update education institution for each country by solving:
γi(τ + 1) : a¯i(τ)−
[
1−
(wL,datai,2000
wH,datai,2000
)]− 1γi(τ+1)
= 0.
3. Stop iteration if
max
i
{
||γi(τ + 1)− γi(τ)||
}
< tolerence,
go back to step 1 otherwise.
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